This study examines the relationship between investment performance and concentration in active equity portfolios. Active management is dependent on the success of two important components in the investment process -stock selection skill and portfolio management. Our study documents a positive relationship between fund performance and portfolio concentration. The relationship is stronger for stocks in which active managers hold overweight positions, as well as for stocks outside the largest 50 stocks listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). We find more concentrated funds tend to be those implementing growth styles, having smaller aggregate assets under management, being institutions which are not affiliated with a bank or life-office entity, whose funds experience past period outflows, and who are benchmarked to narrower indexes than the S&P/ASX 300.
I. Introduction
The extent to which investment performance is rigorously scrutinized is even more significant today than ever before. The significant attention provided fund performance has primarily arisen due to the substantial size of assets delegated to professional money managers, as well as the continued debate between the merits of active versus passive fund management. 1 In terms of the degree of scrutiny applied to tests of active management, recent literature has documented inconsistent evidence with the efficient markets hypothesis, where some value-added is achievable and therefore consistent with the Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) informational equilibrium (e.g. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) , Wermers (2000) , Daniel et al. (1997) , Chen et al. (2000) , Pinnuck (2003) , Gallagher and Looi (2005) ). In particular, Wermers (2000) has contributed significantly to this literature by re-opening the debate about the value of active management, where he utilizes a database of security holdings for U.S. mutual funds. He finds evidence that stocks held by fund managers outperform characteristic-based benchmarks by 1.3 percent per annum on a gross basis (and underperform by -1 percent on a net basis). Wermers' findings suggest that on average, active managers exhibit some degree of stock picking skill to cover their expenses.
In light of Wermers ' (2000) recent evidence supporting the value of active management, subsequent studies have also utilized higher frequency data on equity holdings as a means of better quantifying the stock selection ability of managers from aggregate trading data. This finer decomposition of performance measurement has arisen through the use of snapshots of portfolio 1 According to statistics as at September 2003, $A193 billion in assets are delegated to investment managers by institutional investors, representing 35 percent of all superannuation fund assets. Even more surprising is the significant growth rate in pension fund assets, which have more than doubled since June 1996. The substantial growth in assets managed by investment firms in Australia has been primarily due to compulsory employer sponsored superannuation contributions. The Superannuation Guarantee Levy is equivalent to nine percent of an employer's gross salary.
holdings at quarter-end. 2 While an active manager's stock picking ability can be quantified in terms of the purchase and sale activities executed, aggregate portfolio return also relies on a second important component of portfolio management -portfolio construction. Interestingly, prior research examining both the stockholdings and portfolio allocations to individual securities is limited. Accordingly, our study provides an important contribution to the measurement of active performance using a unique database of monthly portfolio holdings that also includes equities, cash, and derivative securities held by fund managers. While Blake et al. (1999) , Brinson et al. (1986 Brinson et al. ( , 1991 and Chen et al. (2000) identify portfolio design as a significant determinant of total return variation, the literature has only rigorously examined one important phase of the investment process, namely stock picking ability. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to examine an important attribute of portfolio management by quantifying the role of portfolio concentration in active return generation. Portfolio concentration measures the extent to which the portfolio weights held in stocks, industries and sectors deviate from the underlying index or market portfolio.
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Given that active portfolio management requires that fund managers constrain their tracking error volatility through the implementation of a diversified portfolio, the manager therefore faces a trade-off decision between managing the beta risk of the fund, while at the same time implementing strategies designed to capture outperformance relative to the market. While portfolio concentration is defined as deviations of stock weights from the market portfolio, the measure might also be extended to include deviations relative to the risk attributes of the underlying market portfolio. In terms of beta risk, active managers construct and manage 2 Interestingly, Wermers ' (2000) database of portfolio holdings only accounts for stock holdings, and does not include fund exposures to bonds, cash or derivative instruments. Wermers identifies that for the universe of funds irrespective of investment objective, between 79.9 and 85.4 percent of fund assets were held in equities (See Table  1 , p.1664). For an excellent discussion of the Wermers' (2000) study, see Moskowitz (2000) . 3 Fund performance is achieved with respect to two interactive decisions -stock selection and portfolio construction. The former represents the ability of active investment managers to identify and exploit mispriced stocks, and the latter accounts for the portfolio manager's ability to correctly weight the stocks in the portfolio in such a manner which attempts to outperform the market.
portfolios within a mean-variance framework, where portfolio optimization techniques attempt to constrain a fund's tracking error volatility in accordance with the fund's objectives. 4 Therefore, an analysis of portfolio weights relative to the market portfolio represents an important component of a fund's design, and has implications for tracking error risk and performance.
While fund managers are concerned about the need to implement appropriate risk management practices in managing a portfolio's tracking error, increasing the concentration of the portfolio (i.e. in stocks, industries or sectors) is designed to enhance the fund's performance relative to the market. Active portfolio tilts (or bets) reflect a manager's private information set, and the magnitude by which the portfolio deviates from the market index weight is an important determinant of the active fund's total return, and therefore the degree of managerial skill. If active managers hold valuable information, an analysis of portfolio concentration represents a direct test of the value of active management. Accordingly, if skilful managers exhibit capabilities not only in identifying mispriced stocks, but also in managing the portfolio's stock allocation, then superior ability (i.e. performance) should be directly related to a portfolio's concentration.
Empirical evidence concerning the relationship between portfolio concentration and performance is sparse. Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005) are the first to provide rigorous examination to whether industry concentration for U.S. mutual funds is related to performance, and find that those funds with a high degree of industry concentration perform better than funds which hold more stocks across many different industries. Kacperczyk et al.'s (2005) results are consistent with the theory that some funds possess superior investment ability. Their research is also supported by Wermers (2003) , who evaluates the relationship between active fund returns and 4 Return covariances and variances are critical inputs to the optimisation process. Moskowitz (2003) documents the relationship of stock size and to a lesser extent book-to-market value of equity to portfolio covariance risk, and Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (1999) find evidence that market, size, and book-to-market value of equity capture the general structure of these return covariances.
tracking errors for a sample of U.S. mutual funds. Wermers finds a positive relationship between risk (volatility) and performance, confirming that the cross-sectional variation in fund returns is explained by successful managers taking larger portfolio bets. While the magnitude of bets taken by fund managers is an important issue in terms of portfolio concentration and performance, our study also considers the direction of the bet (i.e. under-or-overweight) and the importance of stock size in the allocation decision (given the risk control considerations of active managers). Our study also contributes to the literature by examining how differences in fund size and manager characteristics (e.g. style, organizational structure, benchmark index) explain the degree of portfolio concentration of active Australian equity funds.
Our research provides an important contribution to the performance evaluation literature in a number of other respects. First, we employ a more frequent interval relating to the portfolio holdings of active equity funds (i.e. monthly versus quarterly), providing a more precise estimation of the concentration and performance relationship. Furthermore, the data in this study also accounts for a fund's holdings of exchange-traded options, which ensures a more accurate determination of aggregate stock exposures. While Kacperczyk et al. (2005) argue that industry allocations in portfolio management are important, their study also relies on the assumption that the aggregated industry classifications capture differences in risk dimensions. Their study also relies on self-calculated industry classifications that are not directly observable by fund managers. 5 In comparison, this study employs 24 directly observable industry classifications within the Australian equity market. The Australian case is also interesting, relative to the U.S.
market, in the sense that both the investment industry is highly concentrated, as well as the benchmark index being dominated by a small number of relatively large stocks. This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and is followed by a description of the portfolio design attributes of the active managers in our sample. Section 3 examines the relationship between investment performance and portfolio concentration, followed by an investigation of whether portfolio concentration is explained by specific fund manager characteristics. The final section concludes the study and makes suggestions for future research.
II. Data
This study examines the relationship between portfolio concentration and investment performance for a sample of 37 actively managed institutional equity funds in the period 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2001. The portfolio holdings data is sourced from the Portfolio Analytics Database and contains all assets held by the fund, including stock holdings, options securities, futures contracts and the cash balance. The database reports holdings at a monthly frequency and fund returns are measured on a before expenses and pre-tax basis.
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comparison to the U.S., the ratio of average manager size to average stock size translates into Australian managers being estimated at between 5-10 times larger per stock. 7 The manager holdings data was collected from all participating institutions at a common time period and as a result a degree of survivorship bias is present. However, after comparing the performance of the funds in the Portfolio Analytics Database to the performance of the survivorship free population of funds in the Mercer Investment Consulting Manager Performance Analytics (MPA) database, it appears that this bias is limited. The performance of
The investment managers were each requested to provide information for up to two of their largest institutionally operated active Australian equity fund (i.e. a pooled investment vehicle such as a 'unit trust'). The definition of 'active' fund was explicitly defined as funds exhibiting a target ex-ante tracking error greater than 100 basis points per annum. The term 'largest' was defined as the marked-to-market valuation of assets under management at the end of the sample period. The largest fund was deemed appropriate as being representative of the investment process executed by the investment firm in the management of domestic equity assets.
Given that the database was compiled at a single point in time, was voluntary, and that participation of the managers required contributing a substantial amount of effort in aggregating the information, the data collection procedure adopted was determined as the best means available in maximising participation. The collection procedure was also justified given a number of other considerations. First, and most importantly, the number of pooled products publicly available to institutional investors is small. Indeed, most managers offer only one or two unit trust vehicles across each asset class for institutional investors. By requesting the two largest funds, the study ensures that fund managers are not able to selectively determine which fund data was supplied. Second, the organizational operation of Australian equity funds is typically executed by a team of investment specialists, under the direction of the Head of Equities, and the team includes a number of individual portfolio managers and analysts. The team approach adopted by investment managers within a single investment style ensures that all money invested in that asset class (including private accounts) is managed in a consistent manner.
the funds in the MPA database is very similar to that of the Portfolio Analytics Database funds and indicates our sample is representative of the population. 
III. Portfolio Design
Examination of the performance of active manager portfolios begins with a detailed examination of the portfolio's configuration. Table 2 indicate that on average, active managers hold between 50 and 60 stocks in their portfolios, whereas the median is slightly lower than the mean (ranging between 43 and 54 stocks). In contrast, Kacperczyk et al. (2005) document mean portfolio holdings of 91.42 stocks for U.S. equity mutual funds, and a median of 63 securities. However, this difference in stock holdings between Australian and U.S. managers reflects differences in (1) the universe of stocks available to managers and (2) the composition of market indices.
<<INSERT TABLE 2>>
The degree of concentration present in an investment manager's portfolio is examined in terms of the magnitude of bets (i.e. underweight and overweight) taken relative to the underlying benchmark index. A substantial 'bet' taken for a particular security indicates the manager's future expectations pertaining to the performance of the security. Given that active managers are also concerned with tracking error volatility, it is imperative that appropriate risk controls are implemented such that the portfolio's risk-return objective is not compromised. Table 2 shows the extent to which the aggregate manager moves their portfolio's constituents away from the benchmark index. positions. This asymmetry is expected, given that managers would be expected to hold a greater proportion of stocks they believe will outperform the benchmark, and therefore, the portfolio will be overweight in such stocks relative to the underlying index. On the other hand, underweight portfolio holdings may arise either due to the manager gradually acquiring or liquidating the security, for tracking error management reasons or given trading cost considerations.
IV. The Relationship Between Portfolio Concentration and Investment Performance
The previous section revealed that active managers are prepared to take significant overweight positions in securities on the basis of information, however, the extent to which superior (or inferior) performance is explained by portfolio deviations from the market index remains an empirical issue. Consequently, this section examines the relationship between portfolio performance and the degree of concentration exhibited by the fund. Concentration is examined at the stock level, industry level and on a sector basis.
A. Concentration Measure
Portfolio concentration (referring to the extent to which the fund portfolio deviates from the market portfolio) can be measured using a Divergence Index at either a stock, industry or sector level. This metric was first developed and implemented by Kacperczyk et al. (2005) as an industry concentration measure. The Divergence Index at time t for fund F is defined in equation (1) and is the sum of the squared differences of the weights for N securities in the portfolio (w i,t F ), relative to the weights of the securities in the underlying benchmark (w i,t m ).
In addition to quantifying the divergence of a portfolio on the basis of individual stock holdings, we also examine the portfolio's deviation from the benchmark with respect to holdings at both the industry and sector levels. Standard and Poor's and the ASX classify securities on the basis of 24 industries and 9 sectors (see Appendix 1). These classifications provide additional tests of the performance-concentration relationship, given that fund managers may also deviate their fund holdings from the index on the basis of aggregate stock characteristics (which are defined by industries and sectors). These classifications are performed in an effort to improve the manner in which the level of concentration of a portfolio is measured.
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Alternative measures of portfolio concentration are the Entropy and Herfindahl Indexes. The former is defined as the sum of the weight in each of securities multiplied by the natural log of its weight, and the latter the sum of the squared weights for each of the securities in the portfolio.
However, results for these measures are not considered given the findings of Kacperczyk et al. (2005) , which show these approaches are highly correlated, with the Divergence Index yielding similar results. Furthermore, given that we are interested in the strength (or magnitude) of bets taken against the benchmark, a measure that is relative to the underlying benchmark (i.e. the Divergence Index) is a more intuitive measure. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the Divergence Index over the entire sample period for all active funds. The distribution is skewed to the right across stock, industry and sector classifications, and there exists substantial cross-sectional variation in the Divergence Index levels. However this variation becomes less pronounced as the analysis moves from the stock level to the sector level.
<<INSERT FIGURE 1>>
B. Performance Measures
The relationship between performance and portfolio concentration is examined for each of a series of performance measures, namely fund excess returns to the market index, one and four factor alphas, and the appraisal ratio.
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The 1-factor alpha reported in equation (2) is a risk-adjusted performance measure that controls for a single market factor, estimated using an OLS regression with monthly returns. The four factor model of Carhart (1997) (see equation (3)) employs an additional three factors to the single index model, namely size, book-to-market and momentum. The inclusion of the size and book-to-market factors originates from the seminal work of Fama and French (1993) , while the one-year momentum anomaly identified by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) represents a control of price momentum strategies documented in securities markets.
where:
R it = The excess return of fund i in period t (where excess return is equal to fund return less the risk-free rate);
RMRF t = The excess return of the market portfolio in period t;
= The risk-adjusted excess return (alpha) of fund i using either the one factor or four factor model; In order to capture the impact of idiosyncratic (diversifiable) risk, the appraisal ratio is included as an additional performance measure. This metric reflects the tendency of a portfolio to deviate significantly from the market portfolio, and to incur higher levels of unsystematic risk. The appraisal ratio (see equation (4)), is a modified version of that specified by Treynor and Black (1973) and Kacperczyk et al. (2005) . The former employ the CAPM alpha in the numerator, and the latter the 3-factor alpha of Fama and French. The appraisal ratio appearing in this analysis features the 4-factor alpha as previously defined. It is theoretically evident that investors have a preference for higher appraisal ratios. 
i a′ = The four factor risk-adjusted return (alpha) for fund i in period t; i e o , ′ = The residual standard error for fund i in period t.
C. Regression Analysis
This section employs a multivariate regression model as a means of examining the relationship between active fund performance and portfolio concentration using monthly data. Concentration is examined using the Divergence Index, which is estimated at the stock, industry and sector levels. A series of control variables are also specified in the regression framework in order to capture the impact of fund manager characteristics that are related to portfolio concentration.
The model is estimated as an unbalanced pooling regression with panel corrected standard errors.
11 11 The panel is unbalanced as most of the funds in the sample either do not exist over the entire sample period or whose data was only provided for a limited time period.
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The regression is specified as: For those regressions performed at both the industry and sector level, the variable ITI in equation (6) captures the degree of manager activity in switching between industries/sectors. ITI is measured as the sum of the squared deviations of the weights for each of the industries/sectors held by the funds relative to their portfolio holdings in the previous period.
The regression results examining portfolio performance and the relationship to portfolio concentration, as well as concentration and other manager characteristics, are presented in Table   3 . The coefficients for each of the performance measures are documented in Panels A through D at the stock, industry and sector levels. Consistent with successful active managers exhibiting concentrated portfolios, the coefficient on the Divergence Index is both positive and highly significant for all regressions. These results are also consistent with U.S. evidence for mutual funds.
The positive and significant Divergence Index coefficients for the appraisal ratio regressions indicate that the performance-concentration relationship is not driven by an increase in idiosyncratic or diversifiable risk. Our findings for the 4-factor alpha regressions also indicate that additional risk factors do not provide contradictory evidence from the results obtained when performance is measured using the single index model. In addition, our findings are also robust to different measures of portfolio concentration (i.e. at the stock, industry and sector level).
In order to determine the economic significance of the results, we examine the impact on portfolio performance of an increase in the Divergence Index (as determined by the size of the DI coefficients estimated in the above regressions). The inter-quartile range for the Divergence Index distribution (stock level) is 66.5 points; which is a relevant change in concentration for the purposes of illustrating the economic significance of the performance/concentration relation. We calculate the change in each of the performance measures following an increase of 66.5 points in the Divergence index. The annual excess return for the average fund increases by 2.84% (=66.5*0.00355*12), implying that in addition to being statistically significant, the results are also economically significant. Similarly, the one factor alpha increases by 0.15, the four factor alpha by 0.11 and the appraisal ratio by 0.07.
The impact of a similar increase in concentration at the industry and sector levels does not translate into as great an improvement in fund performance, suggesting that abnormal performance is generated more so by bets made at the stock level. Further evidence supporting this intuition is the negative coefficient on the industry/sector turnover variable, suggesting that better performing funds switch between industries less frequently than poor performing funds.
Therefore, performance appears to be derived from stock picking ability from within industries (i.e. at the stock level) rather than the ability of managers to identify particular industries. This represents an interesting extension to the work of Kacperczyk et al. (2005) .
Portfolio turnover is inversely related to fund performance, such that superior performing funds experience lower trading as a percentage of fund assets, however, this variable is largely insignificant in a statistical sense across the Panels in Table 3 . Smaller funds are found to be the superior performers in our sample across all performance measures, as well as on the basis of all three concentration partitions (i.e. stock, industry and sector levels). It is also evident that on average, older funds record higher performance than younger funds.
<<INSERT TABLE 3>>
D. Over-and Under-Weighting Decisions
The above examination of the relationship between fund performance and concentration at an aggregate level demonstrates an important relationship exists between these variables. However, consideration of the direction of the bet taken (in addition to magnitude) may lead to important insights in terms of portfolio design and fund performance. Therefore, partitioning the portfolio holdings according to overweights and underweights (relative to the benchmark) is also examined, and these results are presented in Table 4 .
<<INSERT TABLE 4>>
As discussed earlier, an active fund manager with a negative outlook for a security is likely to exclude that stock entirely from their portfolio, rather than underweight the security relative to the benchmark weight. Stocks held in the portfolio as underweight exposures likely reflect (1) a change in manager sentiment, leading to the liquidation of the stock over time, (2) the manager progressively acquiring the stock, or (3) the portfolio owning the stock for tracking error considerations. If active managers select stocks on the basis of private information and if stocks are generally owned where a long-only active manager expects the stock to outperform, then the portfolio performance and concentration relationship is likely to be asymmetric (given that stock picking talent is principally determined as an overweight decision).
The results in Table 4 report the panel regression estimates for both overweight and underweight portfolio holdings. In terms of the overweight partition, our results are more significant, both statistically and economically. This is consistent with fund managers deriving superior performance by taking bets on stocks they expect to outperform, and overweighting these in the fund. All concentration coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, and robust to all measures of performance. Moreover, the coefficients are of larger magnitudes than for the aggregate sample (i.e. Table 3 ). In comparison, for the underweight partition, the estimate on the concentration variable is insignificant across all Panels of Table 4 . However, these results are not conclusive, as the analysis in Table 2 shows the average number of underweight positions is significantly lower than the number of overweight positions and thus the Divergence Index calculated for the former may not be as reliable. Furthermore, the lower adjusted R 2 for each of the underweight models points to the power of the test being weaker.
In order to assess the economic significance of these results, and to compare them against the aggregate sample, we examine the implications for performance following a change in the Divergence Index. Increasing the Divergence Index by 66.5 (which is the size of the interquartile range of the stock divergence indexes for the aggregate sample) results in the annual excess return for the fund increasing by 3.00% (compared to 2.84% for the aggregate sample).
This demonstrates that the performance/concentration relationship is stronger for stocks in which the manager is overweight. Similarly, the one factor alpha increases by 0.164, the four factor alpha by 0.132 and the appraisal ratio by 0.091, compared to 0.148, 0.108 and 0.067 for the aggregate sample.
E. Stock Size -Top 50 and Ex-Top 50
Given that active decisions relating to portfolio holdings expose the portfolio to tracking error risk, an individual stock's contribution to portfolio tracking error volatility should be considered in light of how an active fund manager executes active bets. The contribution to tracking error is a function of stock size (or the benchmark index); therefore, small firms may be included in a portfolio for different reasons than large firms. Large stocks cannot be significantly under/over weighted relative to the Index, since even small price movements for large stocks can generate significant over/under performance. In addition, risk compliance practices adopted by investment management institutions seek to constrain the magnitude of the over-and-under weights positions held by their portfolios, particularly in the largest stocks. However, lower tracking error contribution stocks can be more easily removed, or larger bets taken in such securities (subject to liquidity), given they exhibit lower relative tracking error risk. This issue is of particular relevance in the Australian market given the concentrated nature of the ASX. As detailed in Appendix 2, the largest 10 stocks comprise more than 47% of the aggregate weight of the S&P/ASX 300.
In light of the fact that tracking error is directly related to the stock size of index constituents, small stocks are more likely to be included for private information reasons, whereas large stocks should be included and well represented in an active manager's portfolio for both information and non-information reasons. We hypothesize that the performance/concentration relationship is likely to be better explained according to smaller stock positions. Smaller stock holdings also help to ensure greater divergence in holdings across fund managers on the basis of information value, as well as fund managers not facing the same constraints on the portfolio's relative exposure to these stocks. We investigate this by partitioning the sample on the basis of stock size, where regressions are performed for manager's holdings in the largest 50 stocks (Top 50) (ranked by market capitalisation) and ex-top 50 stocks. The results are presented in Table 5 .
<<INSERT TABLE 5>>
Consistent with our hypothesis, the performance/concentration relation is stronger for smaller stocks, and the coefficients for the ex-top 50 sample are economically and statistically significant. For all performance measures (with the exception of 1 factor alpha), the concentration coefficient for the top 50 regressions is indistinguishable from zero. Thus, active managers appear to derive less informational value from large stocks, and this result is also consistent with the findings relating to trading performance by Gallagher and Looi (2005) .
Commonality in large-cap holdings is also more likely to arise across the manager universe, and therefore cross-sectional variation is likely to be smaller compared to ex-top 50 securities. In terms of tracking error and portfolio optimization, we also acknowledge that large stocks have a more important influence on overall fund tracking error, and therefore the deviations away from benchmark weight may be limited by managers. Concentration coefficients for ex-top 50 stocks are all positive and significant at the 1% level and larger than coefficients for top 50 stocks, indicating that concentration in small securities is contributing more to fund performance than larger securities. In Appendix 3 we also report performance and concentration results for the largest twenty stocks, stocks ranked 21-100 by market capitalisation, and the remaining portfolio securities, and report consistent evidence to our findings in Table 5 about the importance of small-cap bets to fund performance.
V. Portfolio Concentration and Fund Manager Characteristics
The existence of a significant and positive relationship between performance and portfolio concentration leads to questions of whether the degree of concentration can be explained with respect to investment manager characteristics. This section examines the determinants of concentration by employing a multivariate regression framework to examine the relationship between the Divergence Index and a series of both qualitative and quantitative fund characteristic variables. The model is estimated as an unbalanced pooling regression with panel corrected standard errors.
The regression model is estimated as: The inclusion of a variable relating to the size of the fund reflects the assumption that larger funds are more susceptible to restrictions, whereby limitations arise with respect to a fund's capacity to hold significantly concentrated portfolios. This is particularly important for larger fund managers, as well as in cases involving smaller and less liquid stocks. 12 Secondly, larger investment organizations are more likely to be subject to prudent man-type investment constraints that may limit the degree to which large bets are taken, and therefore the extent of concentration in a portfolio. Table 6 shows that smaller funds exhibit a higher degree of concentration, witnessed in the negative and significant size coefficient. Table 6 show that value and GARP fund managers exhibit significantly lower concentration, whereas growth funds have significantly more concentrated portfolios.
The regression results in Table 6 include a variable that specifies whether the investment manager emphasizes a "top-down" or "bottom-up" approach in determining the composition of the portfolio. In other words, bottom-up managers emphasize individual stock picking, whereas top-down managers first determine sector bets, and then allocate funds to individual stocks to achieve the desired weight allocations. While the results indicate that a bottom-up approach leads to portfolios which are more heavily concentrated, the coefficient is statistically insignificant. A variable relating to the index against which the fund is benchmarked is also included. While there is very little difference between the market capitalisation coverage (and stock weights) for the S&P/ASX 200 and 300 indices, our results indicate that funds benchmarked to the S&P/ASX 300 are less concentrated than funds benchmarked to narrower indices. This may be motivated by concern for tracking error risk. In order to minimize tracking error risk it is likely that a portfolio benchmarked to the S&P/ASX300 will contain more stocks than those benchmarked to the S&P/ASX200 or S&P/ASX100.
<<INSERT TABLE 6>>
We also examine the institutional structure of the firm to determine whether differences in organisation, incentives, and marketing or distribution platforms explain portfolio concentration.
The analysis is also motivated given the findings of Del Guercio (1996) where bank fund managers tend to be influenced by prudent-man type constraints more than mutual fund managers. This would be expected to minimize the size of the bets taken by these managers, and therefore portfolios would be expected to be more broadly diversified. Our results show that bank and life office affiliated managers hold significantly less concentrated portfolios than other fund managers (e.g. boutiques).
VI. Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research
This study examines the relationship between fund performance and portfolio concentration for a sample of active Australian equity managers. Our study evaluates concentration by assessing how the portfolio's weights across stocks, industries and sectors deviate from the underlying benchmark index. The research represents an important contribution to the literature by empirically examining how portfolio construction impacts on an active manager's ability to earn returns in excess of the market. We document a positive relationship between fund performance and portfolio concentration at the stock, industry and sector levels, which is consistent with successful active managers holding portfolios exhibiting higher concentration. The performance/concentration relationship is also significant (insignificant) for stocks in which managers hold overweight (underweight) positions.
A partition on the basis of stock size was performed in light of active fund managers' portfolio risk control considerations (i.e. tracking error). Given that tracking error is related to the size of stocks in the Index, small stocks are more likely to be included for private information reasons, whereas large stocks are expected be included more as a means of constraining tracking error Portfolio concentration may also be examined in terms of the deviations of the portfolio relative to the risk attributes of the market portfolio. This is motivated by the observation that managers typically construct portfolios with respect to a mean-variance framework (where portfolio optimisation techniques seek to constrain the fund's tracking error volatility). The active 'bets' taken across stocks and sectors represent one empirical test of concentration, and an examination that also examines differences in holdings with respect to mean-variance and optimisation is also likely to be important. Future research should examine the relationship between portfolio concentration and investment manager performance with respect to portfolio optimisation techniques that are implemented by active managers in portfolio construction. Modern Portfolio Theory shows that investors achieve optimal portfolios which are mean-variance efficient.
Indeed, institutional fund managers are highly sophisticated in their use of quantitative risk models in portfolio construction, and various commercial software packages (e.g. BARRA)
provide managers with tools to perform portfolio optimisation outcomes that seek to constrain the fund's tracking error volatility. Return covariances and variances are key inputs to these optimisation techniques and can be incorporated into our determination of portfolio concentration with respect specific risk factors. Moskowitz (2003) documents the relationship of size and book-to-market value of equity to portfolio covariance risk and Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (1999) find evidence that market, size and book-to-market value of equity capture the general structure of these return covariances. Hence, portfolio optimisation techniques represent other important dimensions in portfolio design, and are offered as suggestions for future research. December of each year. Length measures the number of years each of the funds is present in the sample, and is a proxy for fund age. TNA refers to the total net assets under management for each fund as at the end of the month. Turnover is the average annual turnover and is defined as the minimum of purchases and sales over the average TNA for the calendar year. Return is defined as the monthly raw return of the fund.
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Table 2 Portfolio Composition
Panel A reports descriptive statistics relating the number of stocks held by active managers in the period January 1995 to December 2001. Similar descriptive statistics are also reported for the average number of times over benchmark weight for overweight (OW) and underweight (UW) positions in Panels B and C. Times Index Weight (OW) is measured by the stock's weight in the portfolio divided by the index weight for that stock, and is determined for all stocks held by the manager for which the stock's weight in the portfolio is greater than the index weight. Times Index Weight (UW) is measured as the ratio of a stock's index weight in the benchmark, divided by the portfolio's weight held in the stock. In other words, OW and UW ratios are measured differently to one another as a means of ensuring consistency with the definition "times". Summary statistics for the Average Number of OW and UW Positions are also reported in Panels D and E. . The data consists of the holdings of 37 actively managed institutional equity funds between January 1995 and December 2001. Performance measures include fund excess returns (raw return -benchmark return), 1 factor alpha, 4 factor alpha and the appraisal ratio the results for which are seen in Panels A through D. The Divergence Index of fund i at time t is sum of the squared differences of the weights for N securities in the portfolio (w i,t F ), relative to the weights of the securities in the underlying benchmark (w i,t m ). Turnover is the average annual turnover of fund i at time t-3 (minimum of purchases and sales over the average TNA for the calendar year). Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of the total net assets of fund i at time t-3. Log(Length) is the natural logarithm of the length of time in which the manager of fund i at time t appears in the Mercer Investment Consulting Manager Performance Analytics (MPA) database (i.e. a proxy for fund age). Industry/Sector Turnover is the sum of the squared deviations of the weights for each of the industries/sectors held by the funds relative to their holdings in the previous period. The model is estimated as an unbalanced pooling regression with panel corrected standard errors. N. Obs is the number of observations. . The data consists of the holdings of 37 actively managed institutional equity funds between January 1995 and December 2001. Performance measures include fund excess returns (raw return -benchmark return), 1 factor alpha, 4 factor alpha and the appraisal ratio the results for which are seen in Panels A through D. The Divergence Index of fund i at time t is sum of the squared differences of the weights for N securities in the portfolio (w i,t F ), relative to the weights of the securities in the underlying benchmark (w i,t m ). Turnover is the average annual turnover of fund i at time t-3 (minimum of purchases and sales over the average TNA for the calendar year). Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of the total net assets of fund i at time t-3. Log(Length) is the natural logarithm of the length of time in which the manager of fund i at time t appears in the Mercer Investment Consulting Manager Performance Analytics (MPA) database (i.e. a proxy for fund age). Industry/Sector Turnover is the sum of the squared deviations of the weights for each of the industries/sectors held by the funds relative to their holdings in the previous period. The model is estimated as an unbalanced pooling regression with panel corrected standard errors. N Obs is the number of observations. . The data consists of the holdings of 37 actively managed institutional equity funds between January 1995 and December 2001. Performance measures include fund excess returns (raw return -benchmark return), 1 factor alpha, 4 factor alpha and the appraisal ratio the results for which are seen in Panels A through D. The Divergence Index of fund i at time t is sum of the squared differences of the weights for N securities in the portfolio (w i,t F ), relative to the weights of the securities in the underlying benchmark (w i,t m ). Turnover is the average annual turnover of fund i at time t-3 (minimum of purchases and sales over the average TNA for the calendar year). Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of the total net assets of fund i at time t-3. Log(Length) is the natural logarithm of the length of time in which the manager of fund i at time t appears in the Mercer Investment Consulting Manager Performance Analytics (MPA) database (i.e. a proxy for fund age). Industry/Sector Turnover is the sum of the squared deviations of the weights for each of the industries/sectors held by the funds relative to their holdings in the previous period. The model is estimated as an unbalanced pooling regression with panel corrected standard errors. N Obs is the number of observations. is the natural logarithm of the total net assets of fund i at time t-3. Turnover is the average annual turnover of fund i at time t-3 (minimum of purchases and sales over the average TNA for the calendar year). Fund Flow is the annual net fund flow for the previous 12 months of fund i at time t. S j are a series of 3 dummy variables reflecting the investment style, S 1 = 1 for value funds, S 2 = 1 for growth funds and S 3 = 1 for GARP (growth at a reasonable price) funds, the fourth style classification is style neutral/other funds. BU is a dummy variable which is 1 for bottom-up funds and 0 for top-down funds, BM is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the fund is benchmarked to the S&P/ASX 300 and 0 otherwise and BA is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the fund is bank or life office affiliated and zero otherwise. The model is estimated as an unbalanced pooling regression with panel corrected standard errors. N. Obs is the number of observations. 
Dependent

Appendix 1 Industry and Sector Classifications
Securities are classified into 1 of 24 industries and 1 of 9 sectors. The 24 industries are based on the ASX industry classification system that was in effect at the time in which the analysis is conducted. The 24 industries are further subdivided as appears in the 9 sector classification on the basis of the GICS (Global Industry Classification) system. Weights of each industry and sector are reported according to their average representation in the S&P/ASX 300 over the period January 1995 -December 2001. . The data consists of the holdings of 37 actively managed institutional equity funds between January 1995 and December 2001. Performance measures include fund excess returns (raw return -benchmark return), 1 factor alpha, 4 factor alpha and the appraisal ratio the results for which are seen in Panels A through D. The Divergence Index of fund i at time t is sum of the squared differences of the weights for N securities in the portfolio (w i,t F ), relative to the weights of the securities in the underlying benchmark (w i,t m ). Turnover is the average annual turnover of fund i at time t-3 (minimum of purchases and sales over the average TNA for the calendar year). Log(TNA) is the natural logarithm of the total net assets of fund i at time t-3. Log(Length) is the natural logarithm of the length of time in which the manager of fund i at time t appears in the Mercer Investment Consulting Manager Performance Analytics (MPA) database (i.e. a proxy for fund age). The model is estimated as an unbalanced pooling regression with panel corrected standard errors. N Obs is the number of observations. ***, ** indicates statistical significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively
